The internal dynamics and politics of international organizations influence how international policy agendas are set and how effectively they are pursued. International organizations are open systems which respond and adapt to the external policy environment in order to remain relevant to global policymaking. Through an analysis of the internal politics of the World Bank and International Labour Organization, the leading global agenda-setters for pension reform, this article shows that internal political battles and restructuring have a decisive influence on global pensions policy. Appointment of key personnel and internal reorganization can help make certain policy ideas prominent over others. Scholars should pay greater attention to processes of change within international organizations in order to better understand the international agenda setting process.
Introduction
During the 1990s, the World Bank positioned itself as the dominant global actor in pension policy. It led a coalition of transnational actors in a campaign to persuade countries to partially privatize their public pension systems. 1 Drawing on reform experiences in Latin America, it was successful in convincing a number of countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, to carve out a private pension pillar from their public systems (Müller, 1999; Madrid, 2003; Brooks, 2005; Weyland, 2005; Orenstein, 2008) . This entailed diverting funds from the public pension system into individually funded accounts. Following the publication in 1994 of its seminal document on pension systems, Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, (Averting hereafter), official publications from the Bank promoted an almost uniform message on the virtues of a multi-pillar pension system (Beattie and McGillivray, 1995; Orenstein, 2008) . The success of the campaign was in no small part down to this internal coherency and ideological consistency that came out of the Bank for a decade following. However, in many countries, these reforms were short-lived. At the onset of the global economic crisis, most countries that had adopted pension privatization reforms either halted them, drastically reduced the private element, or completely abandoned them (Arza, 2012; Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Orenstein, 2013; Naczyk and Domonkos, 2016; Sokhey, 2017) . These events signaled a retreat by the World Bank in its promotion of the partial privatization of public pension pillars and damaged its reputation in pensions expertise.
The World Bank-led campaign had met with substantial opposition. A rival coalition led by the International Labour Organization (ILO) had opposed the retrenchment of public pension systems. Yet, despite global pensions policy traditionally being the domain of the ILO (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997; Orenstein, 2003; Holzmann 2012; , it was unable to use its authority to stem the tide of successive countries W B pension model. In the years that followed the entry of the World Bank into the pension reform systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of
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The success of the ILO in re-asserting itself as a prominent actor in these debates was not solely down to an enabling external environment. In the years prior to the crisis, ILO social security department had been engaged in a protracted debate over its social protection stance. Eventually, the organization came to an agreed position, culminating in the I L ur Committee (ILC) passing Recommendation 202 on National Social Protection Floors. From this moment onwards, the ILO has benefited from a unified and coherent approach to social protection, which enabled the organization to play a more dominant role in global debates.
This paper focuses on internal policy debates of the World Bank and ILO to examine what role these have had in setting global pension policy. We focus on these two organizations because they are the only two that have dominated, at one time or another, global pension policy agendas the rise of PAYG pension systems worldwide in the case of the ILO and the rise of pension privatization in the case of the World Bank. We demonstrate that a unified and coherent policy stance internally has enabled these international organizations to project global social policy agendas externally. We compare three different periods, one in which the World Bank was dominant, an interim period, and one in which the ILO renewed its influential position. In both instances where one organization was dominant, internal restructuring and the appointment of key personnel gave it the upper hand, while its rival organization was characterized by internal fragmentation and lack of a coherent message. In both cases, internal shifts predated major changes in the global pension policy. Yet internal debates within international organizations are often overlooked in debates on global social policy, despite the pioneering work of Bob Deacon and others in this area (Deacon 2001 (Deacon , 2007 (Deacon , 2013 Deacon & Stubbs 2007) . Scholars more often have analyzed debates between international organizations than within them (Mesa-Lago 1996; Queisser 2000; Ervik 2005 ).
International Organizations and Policy Ideas
Global social policy has been portrayed as an arena in which international organizations and transnational actors compete to influence the welfare reform trajectories of national governments (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997) ; Charlton and McKinnon 2002; Fergusson and Yeates, 2014; Orenstein, 2008 and World Bank on one side arguing for a liberal approach to social policy, against the corporatist approach favored by the ILO and European Union (EU). has challenged this approach to global social policy as an arena solely characterized by contestation. In the field of health policy, there is not one dominant model for international organizations to promote as a beacon for others to aspire to. In addition, international organizations are pressured to justify their own activities in the field. There are therefore better incentives for cooperation rather than competing for the exclusive right to shape policy. The policy environment portrayed in this paper demonstrates evidence of both conflict and cooperation within and between organizations.
Similarly, global social policy scholars have drawn on contrasting traditions in international relations to explain how international organizations set their agendas. Some argue, together with international relations realists, that international organizations are simply the agents of states (Hawkins, et al., 2006) . Within global social policy, a realist position often stresses the influence of the United States over the governance of the two Washington based international organizations, the World Bank and the IMF. It views these institutions as key advocates of an economically liberal direction (Wade, 2002) . The ILO on the other hand, with its headquarters in Europe and its tripartite governance structure, is thought to be much closer to France and Germany.
In contrast, constructivists have emphasized the autonomy of international organizations and their source of power as actors in their own right. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have argued that international organizations have different sources of authority: delegated (from states), expert and moral. Whilst delegated authority reflects a realist world view, the latter two sources are associated with the constructivist perspective. International organizations may gain power and autonomy through expertise or moral suasion. Expertise may enable them to derive power through classifying the world, ordering information so that it is known and interpreted in a certain way. This power to construct reality can orient action from domestic policy makers. Similarly, Dostal (2004) shows that international organizations may create and deploy s and in a broad variety of contexts while convincing other institutions to adopt them These discourses may be shaped shaped by internal value system and cognitive frameworks.
In a development of this constructivist position, Béland & Orenstein (2013) A constructivist position in relation to the power of international organizations, aligns itself with an ideational or discursive approach to policy and politics. A growing number of scholars have begun to focus on ideas as explanatory variables in the process of institutional development and change (Béland, 2005; Béland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; Hay, 2008) . These scholars have stressed that change is not driven (solely) by material conditions and fixed preferences, but rather by how actors interpret their material conditions. From a constructivist perspective, international organizations act as purveyors of policy ideas.
Through their power of classification, they can influence how actors interpret their surroundings and what social problems and solutions make it onto the political agenda (Kingdon, 2014) . Blyth (2002) argued that ideas act as blueprints for change under uncertainty. However, with a multitude of ideas on the menu of policy options, the reasoning behind which ideas are selected was left under-explored. If those with superior resources are able to push their ideas onto the agenda, then ideas become redundant as an explanatory variable, and material resources become the most important factor. The analysis in this paper shows that internal coherency and organization, alongside an enabling zeitgeist, can supersede resources. This does not negate resources as an important variable in explaining how some ideas gain prominence over others, but rather argues that resources are not the only factor.
The External Policy Environment in the 1990s
The end of the Cold War and post-socialist transitions influenced the global social policy environment in the 1990s. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were undergoing the twin transformation from one-party authoritarianism to democracy, and from state socialism to market-based capitalism, accompanied by integration into the global economy. The scale of this transformation had never been undertaken before and a desperate need for foreign capital made the region dependent on the expertise and funds of international financial institutions (Roaf et al., 2014) . As a result, post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe were uniquely susceptible to neoliberal policy advice. Countries in the region engaged signaling , in which they adopted radical neoliberal policies to signal to international investors they were friendly places to do business (Appel and Orenstein 2018) .
In contrast to the traditional client base of the World Bank, post-socialist Central and Eastern
European countries had some of the highest pension spending in the world (World Bank, 1994: 263) . In addition, the region also had a high incidence of pensioner poverty due to a history of inadequate indexing of pension benefits (Müller, 1999) . These systems required large employer contributions, which encouraged tax evasion and undermined the stability and robustness of the system. The region had a rapidly ageing population and a low retirement age. To add to the burden, during the early period of the transformation, the pensions system was used as de facto unemployment benefit to ease the impact of transition on older workers. Vanhuysse (2006) argues that the use of early retirement in Poland and disability pensions in Hungary were tools of protest avoidance. The sudden emergence of mass unemployment in both countries, as a result of entire sectors being made redundant in the transition to capitalism, ripened the conditions for social disorder (Piven and Cloward, 1977) . In effort to avoid this, policymakers encouraged early retirement. This separated the interests of the senior members of the workforce, who were more likely to engage in industrial action, from younger members less embedded in trade union networks. As
Vanhuysse (2006) shows, the level of strike activity was remarkably low, given the level of societal transformation being undertaken and its deep economic consequences. However, the result was a dramatic increase in pension expenditure.
Organizing for Pensions Policy Impact in a Post-Socialist World
The World Bank: 1994 Bank: -2000 The collapse of the communist system represented favorable conditions for the World Bank. academics, who favored parametric reforms to the existing system (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997) . At the same time as the publication of Averting, a rival document with a more cautious approach to pension privatization was published from this division. It argued for parametric reforms to the pension system and a focus on poverty relief (Barr, 1994 ). An internal political battle ensued. However, the rival visions for Central and Eastern European pension systems did not have equal resources. Averting had a $250,000 marketing budget. The alternative proposals had no publicity budget. In addition, Averting drew support from the financial market and development sector of the Bank. It offered the promise of not only financial sustainability in the pension system, but also the chance to develop nascent capital markets in Central and Eastern Europe (Interview with Nicholas Barr, World Bank Consultant, December 2016).
Soon after this internal battle, a unified and coherent message came out from the Bank.
Averting is a document with a degree of different interpretations. Its core message is that in the context of ageing populations, public pension systems are not sustainable. It also argues that private pension provision has additional economic benefits. It therefore calls for a multipillar pension system. For some, it simply stresses the advantages of risk diversification in a multi-pillar pensions system. For others, it advocates a Chilean style pension system across the globe. Those who drew this hard interpretation, such as Estelle James, were more likely to vehemently pursue reforms and were the most passionate in arguing for the benefits of a Chilean style reform. In the years that followed, Robert Holzmann was appointed as Director of the newly created Social Protection and Labor Department in 1997. The main bulk of pension reform technical advice and publications would now come from one department. In contrast to James, Holzmann was more pragmatic than ideological (interview with Emily Andrews, World Bank, August 2017). The Bank continued to support multi-pillar pension reform, whilst also acknowledging its drawbacks (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) .
In sum, a coherent pension policy stance came from the Bank for a sustained period of time.
The campaign for multi-pillar pension reforms won out internally due to the superior resources available to the team behind Averting, the institutional backing of other powerful elements of the Bank, like the financial markets personnel and the establishment of a supportive department active in pensions, the Social Protection and Labor Department. This internal consistency and coherency was necessary to enable the Bank to take its message to the rest of the world with a unified approach.
The ILO: 1994 ILO: -2000 The ILO opened up a Budapest Office in 1992, specifically tasked to offer technical assistance and to influence the post-socialist transition process. However, on pensions, it found itself in an unaccommodating policy environment when the World Bank launched its campaign for pension privatization. Central and Eastern Europe represented an ideal-type for the World B blic pension systems. The ILO found itself trying to defend a pension system demonstrably failing, in a region with politicians unsympathetic to the public sector (Fultz, 2012) .
The Social Security Department of the ILO had been deeply opposed to the message of Averting. However, its initial response to Averting was low-key, coming in the form of a journal article in collaboration with the ISSA (Beattie & McGillivray, 1995) . Here the authors argued that replacing public pension systems with mandatory private savings placed an unacceptably high degree of risk on workers and pensioners. In addition, they argued it would make old-age pensions more expensive and that the transition would impose a substantial fiscal burden on current and future workers. They proposed parametric reforms to old age pension systems, such as raising the retirement age or increasing the contribution rates, to keep systems in balance.
However, the internal structure of the ILO precluded the development of a more significant alternative to Averting (Baccaro & Mele, 2012) . The ILO has a tripartite governance structure of employer, trade union and country representatives. it produced a document broadly in line with the message of Averting. Specifically, the ILO recognized a role for both defined benefit and defined contribution pensions, alongside a role for the private sector in pension provision (Gillion, 2000) .
The Campaign for National Social Protection Floors
The It sought to be a steering committee to bring together a movement for social protection floors under the UN umbrella. It was established in the context of debates around a fairer globalization and global inequalities. In addition, these debates were taking place in parallel with the positive experiences of modern forms of universal social policy in the global south, such as the conditional cash transfer programs being rolled out in Latin America (Huyse, et al., 2017) . As it will be shown below, the campaign would be given further impetus in the ILO ubstantially enhanced and formalized. However, it is important ILO ation took place prior to the onset of the global financial crisis.
The World Bank: 1999 Bank: -2009 While the ILO was shifting to a new consensus on social protection, the World Bank was undergoing substantial internal debate on its promotion of a multi-pillar pension model.
Opposition to Averting was first brought into the spotlight at the end of the 1990s with a provocative paper coauthored by its Chief Economist titled: Rethinking pension reform: Ten myths about social security systems (Orszag & Stiglitz, 1999 Averting. This new volume would be a joint cross-sectoral report by the World Bank to explain to the rest of its staff, and the world, its position on pensions (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) . Whilst it largely reasserted the case for a multi-pillar framework of public and private provision, as a way to diversify risk, it acknowledged that more needed to be done on poverty alleviation and coverage. The report was reviewed by five external experts, including prominent critics Group was led by Emily Andrews who was approaching mandatory retirement at the Bank.
Her report argued that some of the benefits of multi-pillar reform had been oversold by the Bank. It called for greater attention to parametric pension reforms and echoed the findings on the Latin American report that of multi-pillar reform had been disappointing in its promise to extend coverage of pension provision. It argued that much greater attention needed to be paid to initial conditions before advocating multi-pillar reform (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006) . Alongside a critique of multi-pillar pension systems, the World Bank was also beginning to shift its focus towards coverage. Holzmann and Hinz (2005) recognized this as an area where the Bank had more work to do. In 2009, this was expressed more explicitly in Closing the Coverage Gap, which focused on the role of non-contributory pensions and minimum pension guarantees (Holzmann, et al., 2009; Deacon 2013 ).
The 2008 Global Economic Crisis
As the ILO moved towards a policy consensus in the mid to late 2000s, and the World Bank drifted towards dissensus, the global economic crisis would crystalize these positions. At the onset of the downturn it represented a crisis of the global economic structure; justifying a large-scale intervention of the state in the management of the economy. In an effort to offset the impact of the downturn, governments around the world used an active fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand or to rescue insolvent banks. Much of this action was coordinated at the global level through the G20. It was also supported by the IMF (IMF, 2008) .
In addition, the role of social security was recast. The dominant message from the World Bank on the sustainability of pension systems, and the virtues of private provision, were drowned out in a context of market volatility and economic contraction. In the immediate crisis era, the role of social security as an automatic stabilizer in the economy was emphasized (IILS, 2011) . In light of this, the ILO found itself invited to the top table of global governance to report how social security could be deepened to embed its role as an automatic stabilizer in the global economy (Deacon, 2013) . M W B -pillar pension model. Farnsworth and Irving (2011) argue that the global economic crisis is not one, but a series of separate, interrelated crises (see also Starke, et al., 2013) . Beginning with the credit crunch in 2007, the first crisis was one of financial markets starved of liquidity. This then led to a crisis in the real economy, as the growth rate for the world economy turned negative in 2009. The impact on pension funds was almost immediate as stock markets recorded huge losses. The OECD estimates $5 trillion dollars was wiped off pension assets during the crisis (Keeley & Love, 2010) .
The adverse effect on pension returns after the crisis exacerbated the already weak performing private pension pillars in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, in every country apart from Poland, Croatia and Romania, the pension contributions would have made a superior return in the first pillar than their investment in the second pillar, as economic growth rates were higher than market returns.
Insert Table 1 here
Next came a fiscal crisis, which threatened the stability of the Eurozone, as markets turned on the debt levels of Southern Europe. The state activism of the early crisis period was replaced by an era of austerity. Balanced budgets became an important signal of economic stability, rather than the enactment of avant-garde neoliberal reforms. A renewed emphasis on balancing budgets helped to make the case for overturning pension privatization. In privatized pension systems, a proportion of the contributions to the public pension system were diverted into individually funded accounts. However, the pensions of those already retired still needed to be paid. This created a shortfall in pension revenues needed to finance the payment of pensions that was financed by government debt. This borrowing cost as much as 1.9% of GDP each year (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012) . At the same time, accession to the European Union (EU) required abiding by Maastricht Criteria on the budget deficit and national debt, which stipulates that member states cannot run a budget deficit larger than 3% of GDP or a national debt larger than 60% of GDP. Suspending, scaling down, or completely reversing the multi-pillar pension model to meet these requirements became a tempting option for all countries in the region.
Suspending the multi-pillar model meant that contributions diverted into funded accounts could be temporarily redirected into the state coffers to ease a budgetary crisis. This option was undertaken by the Baltic states in the immediate crisis period (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012) . Scaling down did the same thing, to a smaller degree, but on a permanent basis.
Slovakia chose this option (ibid). Completely abandoning the multi-pillar system permanently diverted the contribution back into general tax revenues. It also gave the state access to the accumulated pension funds that had built up during the funded period. This option was undertaken by Kazakhstan, Hungary, and to a lesser extent, Poland (Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016) . Alongside the reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin American countries such as Argentina and Bolivia renationalized their funded pension pillars (Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016) . Table 2 summarises the pension reform reversals in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Insert Table 2 here
model sent to the global policy community, the World Bank had also lost its leverage in Central and Eastern Europe. In the early transition period, the Bank had used its lending capacity to influence finance ministers across the region (Müller, 1999; Appel & Orenstein, 2018) . However, as the region became more integrated into the global economy and the EU, many of the world emerging economies. In order to remain relevant, Kim sought to breakdown the regional silos that, he argued, discouraged the sharing of best practice (Lowrey, 2014) . His reorganization consisted of abandoning the geographical structure of the Bank to replace it with global practices, with technical expertise in specific policy areas. It was B projects, alongside lending to those locked out of international capital markets (Financial Times, 2014) . The reorganization was conducted over two years and was unpopular with World Bank staff. Alongside concerns about losing the local expertise necessary for policy implementation, it coincided with a high turnover of senior departures. To illustrate the level of dissatisfaction, in an emergency town hall style meeting with the President, 8000 out of 10,000 staff were present, including 5000 tuning in online from across the globe (Birdsall, 2014) .
As a consequence of this controversial restructuring, the World Bank was inward looking at a time when one of its flagship pension schemes was being abandoned across the globe. In 2008, the World Bank issued guidance on the crisis and funded pillars. At this point only Argentina had closed down its second pillar and the Bank was (correctly) fearful of more countries doing the same. It cautioned against dramatic systemic responses to short-term shocks (Dorfman, Hinz, & Robalino, 2008 (Murthi, 2014) . Here she gave an overview of pension developments in the region and suggested why countries had opted to scale down or close their second pillars but stopped short of criticizing them. Another candid assessment came from outside the Bank by its former Social Protection and Labor Director. Writing in a personal capacity, his position paper acknowledged many of the challenges for multi-pillar pension reforms such as market volatility, exorbitant fees and the possibility of a new permanent low in returns on assets (Holzmann, 2012) .
In sum, as a result of personnel changes, internal disruption and an unaccommodating external W B -pillar pension reform broke down. In addition, the client base of the Bank was now primarily developing countries, where the establishment of social pensions or the so-called zero pillar was the priority. This sharpened the focus on coverage and systems development to administer non-contributory benefits.
The ILO from 2008 onwards
Once the Social Security Department had reached a unified position on social protection floors, it was able to move the campaign to the next stage. The campaign for social protection floors had three dimensions (interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018). First, it needed to convince all interested parties about the affordability of a social protection floor for low income countries. Here the department developed sophisticated modelling exercises poorest countries (Pal, et al., 2005) .
The next stage in the campaign was to convince the rest of the ILO of the importance of social protection. The social protection department is much smaller than other ILO departments and does not carry the same authority as employment and labor rights (Huyse, et al., 2017) .
Cichon was able to raise the status of social protection by aligning his agenda with the wider Decent Work agenda promoted by the Director-General Juan Somavia. The Decent Work Agenda has four pillars: full and productive employment, rights at work, social protection and the promotion of social dialogue (ILO, 2012: 9) . Cichon campaigned to give social protection the equal weight as the other four pillars.
Finally, the task was to convince the constituents of the ILO in order to adopt a recommendation at the ILC in 2012. Cichon demonstrated pragmatism in this process. He abandoned the campaign for a singular concept of a social protection floor, to the plural concept of national social protection floors. The concept of a social protection floor was also refined from a set of benefits to a set of guarantees that could be delivered in a variety of ways (Deacon, 2013) . This diluted the concept as it allows national governments to interpret minimum standards. However, it shielded the ILO from criticism from the global south that it was a tool of the global north to impose protectionist standards. In the event, these tradeoffs resulted in the ILO Recommendation 202 being unanimously adopted by the ILC in 2012. The ILO had a unified position on social protection, which had been endorsed internationally all ILO .
Shortly after the passing of Recommendation 202, Cichon retired as Director of Social Security. However, unlike in the instance of the World Bank where retirement stalled the policy development, his replacement, Isabel Ortiz was something of a continuity candidate ILO I UNDE"A UNICEF,
she had been part of the Coalition for a Global Social Floor. The Department of Social Security was renamed the Department for Social Protection (SOCPRO) to bring its name in line with the terminology used in global policy documents. In addition, the department shifted focus slightly from technical assistance to global advocacy. This was done by reorienting existing capacity away from highly specialized technical positions to a larger number of junior profiles to support global advocacy campaigns (Huyse, et al., 2017) .
The outcome of the increased resources dedicated to global advocacy has been effective for the ILO. It was successful in its efforts to influence the UN Sustainable Development Agenda.
This agenda will largely determine the orientation of development-related resources both globally and nationally. After lobbying from the ILO, social protection was integrated into five of the seventeen sustainable development goals. This means that social protection is now a key focus of the development agenda for many years to come. Notably, goal 1.3 explicitly mentions social protection floors. As a response, the ILO, in collaboration with the World Bank, launched the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection. This will be one of the main mechanisms for delivering the Sustainable Development Goals on social protection, with the ILO as a lead actor. It brings together a large number of international organizations and development partners, presenting itself as a follow up to earlier global universalism initiatives on universal education and universal health coverage.
A new partnership or old rivalries?
The Global Partnership is symbolic of the development of the relationship between the ILO and World Bank. At one time the two organizations were in heated opposition in their visions for pension policy. The evolution of positions in both organizations has paved the way for a much more collaborative relationship over the past decade. However, whilst both organizations use similar discourse on universal social protection and social protection floors, differences remain. A key difference is the interpretation of universal. For the World Bank, universal means everyone having some form of coverage, for the ILO it means everyone having the same coverage. This brings the role of means testing into sharp focus. In a recent report, the World Bank argued that means testing was more effective at reducing poverty in old age social pensions (World Bank, 2018: 83) . For now, the rolling out of coverage to those who have none fosters close collaboration between the two organizations, since both are primarily focused on creating coverage. However, these differences in interpretation and orientation may have implications in for activities in the field and the technical advice given, particularly in the years to come as the vertical dimension of social protection takes precedent.
Conclusion
The internal dynamics of international organizations can be instrumental in setting global policy agendas. At critical moments in global political economy, actors within the World Bank and ILO were instrumental in shaping debates and orienting action. When ideas align with the prevailing paradigm, a coherent, organized message can supersede rival ideas. This analysis has shown how the World Bank gained superiority in global pension debates during the 1990s.
These ideas aligned with the dominance of neoliberal ideas across the globe. However, they were also dependent upon an organized internal campaign within the Bank and an
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campaign for pension privatization, realigned its priorities and organized for impact with the restructuring of its Social Security Department. The global economic crisis gave the social protection floor the impetus it needed both within and outside of the ILO. However, this
would not have been possible without the promotion and ascendancy of Michael Cichon and his team, who prepared the ground for the idea to take off. As Deacon argued in his final work, the biographies of actors can be instrumental in the global social policy process (Deacon, 2013) . This paper has developed this argument through the framework of an interaction between features of the external environment and the internal dynamics of international organizations.
